When allocating indivisible objects, agents might have equal priority rights for some objects. A common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic allocation mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex-ante. We propose a concept of ex-ante fairness and show the existence of an agent-optimal ex-ante fair solution. Exante fair random allocations are generated using "allocation by division", a new method of generating random allocations from deterministic allocation mechanisms. Some important results from the two-sided matching theory and the recent random assignment literature are unified and extended. The set of exante fair random allocations forms a complete lattice under first-order stochastic dominance relations. The agent-optimal ex-ante fair mechanism includes both the deferred acceptance algorithm and the probabilistic serial mechanism as special cases.
Introduction
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects, such as houses, tasks, organs or public high school seats, to agents when monetary transfers are not possible. While agents have preferences over heterogeneous objects, each object often has its own priority ranking over the agents. For instance, in school choice programs, public high schools usually have priorities over students based on exam scores or "walk zone and sibling rules". 1 Moreover, coarse priority rankings are common: a group of students may be given equal priority at a certain school. Pure indivisible object allocation problems without specific priorities, i.e., house allocation (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979) , also include a (degenerate) priority structure: all the agents have equal claim and are ranked equally for each object. In this paper, we study fair and efficient solutions to such priority-augmented allocation problems, allowing for general and, possibly, weak priority structures.
Given the possible ties in priorities, random allocations are necessary to restore fairness. The most common way of generating random allocations, both in theory and in practice, is to first break the ties in priorities using a randomly selected ordering of agents, then apply a deterministic allocation mechanism. Examples include random serial dictatorship (RSD) in house allocation (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1998) 2 , top trading cycles mechanism in house allocation with existing tenants Sönmez, 1999, Sönmez and Ünver, 2005) and deferred acceptance mechanism in school choice (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) . Randomizing over deterministic allocation mechanisms generally preserves strategyproofness of the deterministic allocation mechanisms, but the resulting allocations might not be (constrained) efficient or fair from the ex-ante perspective (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 , Erdil and Ergin, 2008 , Kesten and Ünver, 2015 . We propose a new and normatively appealing fairness concept, ex-ante fairness, which is generally not satisfied by existing random allocation mechanisms. Ex-ante constrained 1 When schools use the walk zone and sibling rules, a student's priority at a school is determined by two criteria: whether the student is living within the walk zone of this school and whether the student has a sibling studying at this school.
2 RSD selects a random allocation by picking an ordering of the agents from the uniform distribution and letting the agents choose their favorite available object sequentially according to this ordering. If we want to allocate one object between two agents with equal claim, tossing a coin is the simplest form of RSD. This results in a random allocation in which each agent receives this object with 0.5 probability. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) show that RSD is equivalent to randomizing over core mechanisms.
efficiency can be achieved: we provide a mechanism that selects the unique ex-ante fair random allocation which first-order stochastically dominates every other exante fair random allocation. Instead of the usual randomization method, ex-ante fair allocations are generated using allocation by division, a new way of extending deterministic allocation mechanisms to the probabilistic setting.
Ex-ante fairness is defined as the combination of two axioms: ex-ante stability and ordinal fairness. The original stability concept for deterministic allocations (Gale and Shapley, 1962, Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) says that an object should not be given to an agent with a lower priority when it is desired by an agent with a greater claim to it. Ex-ante stability is the natural generalization of this concept to the probabilistic setting. It requires that if one agent is ranked higher than another agent for some object, then it is not possible for the second agent to receive this object with a positive probability, while the first agent receives a worse object with a positive probability. 3 Ordinal fairness, on the other hand, requires that if some agents are ranked equally by an object, the allocation of this object among them should try to equalize each one's probability of obtaining a weakly better object. This is a natural adaption of the original ordinal fairness axiom defined by Hashimoto et al. (2014) in house allocation to our context. They show that ordinal fairness characterizes probabilistic serial mechanism (PS) proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) . 4 In PS, the agents consume the probability shares of their best available objects simultaneously at the unit rate. This new solution to house allocation has superior efficiency and fairness properties from the ex-ante perspective compared to RSD. The introduction of PS leads to a growing literature on random assignment. While ordinal fairness is the defining feature of PS, ex-ante stability corresponds to the central concept in classical two-sided matching theory starting from Gale and Shapley (1962) . Consequently, by studying ex-ante fairness, results in this paper unify and extend important solutions and insights from these two strands of matching literature.
Our first set of results establish that the set of ex-ante fair random allocations is well-behaved. In particular, it is a complete and distributive lattice under the first-order stochastic dominance relation of the agents. Hence there exists a unique agent-optimal ex-ante fair random allocation. We also establish a generalized version of rural hospital theorem (Roth, 1986) : each agent or object's probability of being assigned is the same across all the ex-ante fair random allocations. In some context, objects are not entirely passive and have intrinsic preferences that are aligned with their priorities. 5 In this case, agents and objects have opposite interests over ex-ante fair random allocations; each ex-ante fair random allocation is stochasticdominance efficient for the two sides of the market. All of these results generalize the key insights regarding stable deterministic allocations from the classical twosided matching theory. 6 They do not hold for stable deterministic allocations when priorities are weak. One general question in two-sided matching theory is to what extent the properties of stable allocations depend on the specific model assumptions. It has long been believed that strict orderings on both sides of the market is an indispensable assumption. Hence our main contribution to this line of research is to establish that the lattice structure, as well as many other properties of stable allocations, holds under weak priorities if we consider random allocations and define stability properly. 7 We construct generalized deferred acceptance mechanism (GDA) which selects the unique agent-optimal ex-ante fair random allocation. When priorities are strict, GDA reduces to the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) , which selects the (deterministic) agent-optimal stable allocation. GDA reduces to PS when priorities are degenerate. Hence our first contribution to the random assignment literature is to provide the first generalization of PS to priority-augmented allocation problems. More importantly, we reinterpret the idea behind the original PS solution as a new method of generating random allocations through deterministic allocation mechanisms: allocation by division.
The basic idea behind this method is as follows. We first divide agents and objects into equal number (or measure) of parts. Then, we define strict priorities over the parts of each agent and treat parts of agents in the same priority group symmetrically. Finally, applying a stable deterministic allocation mechanism to this divided 5 For instance, in school choice, if public high schools' priorities are determined by students' exam scores, then it is likely that the schools' preferences are consistent with priorities.
6 See Roth and Sotomayor (1992) for a survey on the classical results in two-sided matching. 7 It is worth noting that two important results from the two-sided matching theory cannot be generalized into our framework: stability is equivalent to the core and the agent-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof. We discuss such incentive issues in more details in Section 5.
problem generates a fair random allocation for the original problem. 8 Given a general priority structure, the nature of the problem requires that each agent or object has to be divided into a continuum of parts. A stable deterministic allocation in the continuum matching problem gives an ex-ante fair random allocation for the original problem. Applying the deferred acceptance algorithm to the continuum problem leads to our GDA. However, for simple priority structures it is sufficient to divide agents and objects into finite number of parts. In fact, the previous generalizations of PS can be obtained by applying some form of serial dictatorship to finitely divided problems. In particular, the generalization of PS to house allocation with weak preferences (Katta and Sethuraman, 2006) can be obtained from the serial dictatorships of Svensson (1994) . The generalization of PS to allocation problems with initial property rights (Yılmaz, 2010) can be obtained from individually rational serial dictatorships. Two generalizations of PS to house allocation with multi-unit demands (Kojima, 2009 , Heo, 2014 can be obtained from two forms of serial dictatorships under multi-unit demands (Pápai, 2000 , Klaus and Miyagawa, 2001 , Ehlers and Klaus, 2003 , Bogolmonaia et al., 2014 . Finally, Budish et al. (2013) generalize PS to accommodate various constraint structures, such as controlled choice requirements in school choice. This version of PS can also be obtained from a constrained sequential allocation procedure.
Randomizing over deterministic mechanisms is a commonly observed practice to generate fair random allocations. When allocating one single object between two agents, tossing a coin is the simplest form of RSD. An alternative common solution is rotation or time-sharing: each agent has this object for half of the time. Such a method can be considered as a simple application of allocation by division. By formalizing this idea of allocation by division, it can be seen that all of the PS solutions, as well as our ex-ante fair solutions, have their foundations in deterministic mechanisms. As pointed out in Bogolmonaia et al. (2014) , three usual ways of fair allocation in the presence of indivisibility are randomization, rotation and monetization. However, monetary transfers are often not appropriate or ethical in practical market design problems.
8 As a simple and concrete example, consider the allocation of one single object between two agents with equal claim. We can divide each agent and the object into two parts, with the first parts of the two agents having an equal and higher priority than the second parts of them. Then, in any stable deterministic allocation, the first part of each agent receives one part of the object. This leads to a fair random allocation for the original problem, in which each agent receives this object with 0.5 probability.
Related literature
Our study is related to several strands of matching literature. First, after the initial seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1962) , the key insights in the two-sided marriage problem have been generalized in different directions by several important studies, including Crawford and Knoer (1981) , Kelso and Crawford (1982) , Roth (1984) , Roth et al. (1993) , Alkan and Gale (2003) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) . We complement this line of research by extending the theory to problems with one-sided weak orderings. Both Roth et al. (1993) and Alkan and Gale (2003) establish the lattice structure of stable random matchings, but the former assumes strict orderings and the latter takes a revealed preference approach.
The random assignment literature had been very small until the introduction of PS in the seminal work of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) . Many studies contribute to a better understanding of this intuitive new allocation mechanism that possesses superior fairness and efficiency properties. In addition to axiomatic characterizations of PS given by Bogomolnaia and Heo (2012) and Hashimoto et al. (2014) , Kesten (2009) shows that PS can be viewed as a form of RSD or top trading cycles mechanism, 9 Che and Kojima (2010) show that PS and RSD are asymptotically equivalent in large markets, and recently Bogomolnaia (2015) provides a new and welfarist interpretation of PS. We contribute to this literature by reinterpreting the PS solutions as a method of allocation by division.
Priority-augmented allocation has been studied extensively in the context of school choice problems, starting from Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) . Given weak priorities, one common solution is deferred acceptance algorithm with a fixed tie-breaking rule. 10 Such a mechanism is ex-post stable, but might not be fair from the ex-ante perspective. Kesten and Ünver (2015) is the first study on designing random allocation mechanisms that are fair or stable ex-ante in this context. Our ex-ante fairness is similar to their strong ex-ante stability which consists of ex-ante stability and another condition called no ex-ante discrimination. They construct fractional deferred acceptance algorithm (FDA) which is agent-optimal strongly ex-ante stable. Our GDA closely resembles FDA, but there is no logical relation between the two. 9 Although the interpretation is different, Kesten (2009) also touches on the idea of allocation by division. His results imply that if we infinitely divide the standard house allocation problem under strict preferences, then serial dictatorships will converge to PS.
10 Deferred acceptance algorithm with a fixed tiebreaking rule is currently used in many school choice programs in the U.S. See Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005a) and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005b) .
Finally, there are several recent studies on continuum matching markets, for instance, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2015) , Azevedo and Hatfield (2015) , Che et al. (2015) and Azevedo and Leshno (forthcoming) . In these studies, continuum matching markets are used to model large markets and may help eliminate difficulties in finite matching problems. In this paper we do not focus on large markets. Instead, we use continuum matching models to obtain results regarding finite problems. However, the continuum matching models do help us eliminate the technical difficulties in applying the allocation by division method to problems with general priority structures.
In the next section we set up the model. Section 3 presents results regarding the structure of the set of ex-ante fair random allocations. Section 4 focuses on the generalized deferred acceptance mechanism. Section 5 discusses the method of allocation by division in general. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are in the appendices.
Preliminaries
Let N be a finite set of agents and A a finite set of objects. Each agent i ∈ N has a complete, transitive and antisymmetric preference relation R i on A ∪ {i}, where P i denotes its asymmetric component. R = (R i ) i∈N is a preference profile. Each object a ∈ A has a complete and transitive priority ordering ≽ a on N ∪ {a}, where ≻ a and ∼ a denote its asymmetric and symmetric components, respectively. ≽= (≽ a ) a∈A is a priority structure. For simplicity, assume that each pair of agent and object is "mutually acceptable": for any i ∈ N, a ∈ A, aP i i and i ≻ a a. 11 A problem is summarized as e = (N, A, R, ≽).
Given e = (N, A, R, ≽), a random allocation, or simply an allocation, is a |N| × |A| matrix M with M ia ≥ 0, ∑ b∈A M ib ≤ 1, and ∑ j∈N M ja ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A. For i ∈ N, M i = (M ia ) a∈A∪{i} denotes the lottery obtained by i, with M ii = 1 − ∑ a∈A M ia . M a and M aa are defined analogously for each a ∈ A. M is a deterministic allocation if M ia ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A. By the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem (Birkhoff, 1946 , von Neumann, 1953 , every random allocation can be represented as a lottery over deterministic allocations. 12 11 All the results still hold in the setting where "being self-assigned" is not necessarily an agent's worst option, and each object can rank some agent below "being assigned nothing".
12 See Budish et al. (2013) for a maximal generalization of this theorem to a broader class of alloca-A random allocation M is non-wasteful if M aa > 0 and M ib > 0 imply bR i a for any i ∈ N, a ∈ A and b ∈ A ∪ {i}. A deterministic allocation M is stable if it is non-wasteful and there is no justified-envy, i.e., there do not exist i, j ∈ N, a ∈ A and b ∈ A ∪ {i} such that i ≻ a j, M ib = M ja = 1 and aP i b. An agent i can compare some lotteries M i and M ′ i using the first-order stochastic dominance relation R sd i :
A mechanism is a function f that assigns a random allocation to each problem.
f is said to satisfy some property mentioned above if f (e) satisfies this property for all e. f is strategy-proof if for any e = (N, A, R, ≽), i ∈ N and e ′ = (N,
Ex-ante fairness
Fix a problem e = (N, A, R, ≽) in this section. First, in a fair allocation the assignment of each object should always accommodate the demand of higher ranked agents first.
Definition 1 A random allocation M is ex-ante stable if (i) it is non-wasteful, and (ii) there do not exist i, j ∈ N, a ∈ A and b ∈ A ∪ {i} such that i ≻ a j, M ja > 0, M ib > 0 and aP i b.
Ex-ante stability is first proposed in Roth et al. (1993) , and further studied in Manjunath (2015) and Kesten and Ünver (2015) . Condition (ii) is essentially a probabilistic version of the no justified-envy condition. It requires that a random allocation respects the priority structure from the ex-ante prospective when agents compare their lotteries. An ex-ante stable random allocation can only be represented as lotteries over stable deterministic allocations.
Ex-ante stability does not put many restrictions on a random allocation if the priority structure is very coarse. Next, in light of the possible ties in priorities, we impose the following fairness condition.
Definition 2 A random allocation M is ordinally fair if for any i, j ∈ N and a ∈ A with i ∼ a j,
This concept is first introduced in Hashimoto et al. (2014) for house allocation problems, where every pair of agents is ranked equally by each object. Together with non-wastefulness, it characterizes probabilistic serial mechanism (PS) (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) . Two standard fairness axioms in house allocation problems are equal treatment of equals and sd-envy-freeness. The former requires that any two agents with the same preferences should be assigned the same lottery, while the latter says that each agent's lottery should first-order stochastically dominate any other agent's lottery. These two axioms are not appropriate in our context since generally, agents may not have equal claims for every object. Thus fairness has to be defined "locally" at each object. Ordinal fairness requires that when two agents are ranked equally by some object a, the one who has a lower probability of being assigned a strictly better object should get a higher probability share of a. In other words, the allocation of the probability shares of an object among agents in the same priority class should try to equalize each of these agents' "surplus" at this object.
These two axioms constitute the central concept in this paper.
Definition 3 A random allocation M is ex-ante fair if it is ex-ante stable and ordinally fair.
If we restrict attention to strict priorities and deterministic allocations, then exante fairness is equivalent to stability. An ex-ante fair random allocation always exists, but we postpone the construction of an ex-ante fair mechanism to the next section. Denote the set of ex-ante fair allocations as E . In the rest of this section we discuss properties of ex-ante fair allocations.
First, since a stable and efficient deterministic allocation may not exist (Roth, 1982, Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) , ex-ante fairness and sd-efficiency are generally not compatible. In some context, objects have intrinsic preferences over the agents. If such preferences are consistent with the priorities, then any ex-ante fair allocation is "sd-efficient" for the two sides of the market.
This generalizes the result that any stable deterministic allocation is efficient for the two sides of the market when priorities are strict. To further study and understand ex-ante fairness, we rely crucially on a continuum matching market that corresponds to our finite allocation problem.
A continuum matching market
Imagine that each agent or object is a type, and there is a continuum of copies of each type. For each o ∈ N ∪ A, there is a bijection, also denoted as o, from [0, 1] to all the copies of type o. We take a new and natural deterministic approach to the random allocation problem. 13 Any random allocation of A to N in the original problem can be represented by a deterministic matching between the atomless objects {a(x)} a∈A,x∈ [0, 1] and the atomless agents {i(x)} i∈N,x∈ [0, 1] . Let C be the collection of all the closed intervals in [0, 1]. For our purpose, it is sufficient to consider how "intervals of objects", {a(F)} a∈A,F∈C , are matched with "intervals of agents", {i(F)} i∈N,F∈C . 14 To complete the description of the continuum matching market, we extend preferences and priorities to the intervals. Given
Thus for each type, atomless agents closer to zero are assumed to be higher ranked. Each P i(F) is defined analogously.
Generally there are multiple matchings of intervals that represent a random allocation. We want to translate the ex-ante fairness of a random allocation to the stability of some deterministic matching in the continuum market. Thus some restrictions have to be imposed on the matchings of intervals. Before formally defining a matching of intervals and its stability, we use the following simple example to illustrate the ideas behind them.
Example 1 Suppose N = {i, j} and A = {a, b}. Preferences are given by aP i b and aP j b. Priorities are given by i ∼ a j and i ≻ b j. The unique ex-ante fair allocation is M:
Suppose that some "stable" matching of intervals µ represents M. and for any interval [x, y] 
It can also be easily seen that i ≻ b j requires that
We define a few more notations. A partition of [0, 1] is a finite set of real numbers
Formally, an interval matching is a function µ defined on the domain {o(F) : o ∈ N ∪ A, F ∈ C}, which satisfies the following properties.
A.1 (Partitions of agents) For each
i ∈ N, there is a partition Q i of [0, 1] such that for any F ∈ F (Q i ), µ(i(F)) = {(λ, a(G))} for some a ∈ A ∪ {i}, G ∈ C and λ ∈ (0, 1] with |F| = λ|G|, where F = G if a = i.
A.2 (Partitions of objects)
For each a ∈ A, there is a partition Q a such that for any
A.3 (Mutual matching) For any
A.4 (Uniformity) Given F, G ∈ C, define the linear function f :
A.5 (General intervals) For any
An interval matching µ induces a unique well-defined random allocation M:
|F|
For any random allocation, there always exists an interval matching that induces it. 16 The details are given in Appendix B.
Definition 4 An interval matching µ is F-stable if there do not exist
Lemma 1 Suppose that µ induces M, then M is ex-ante fair if and only if µ is F-stable.
The structure of the set of ex-ante fair random allocations
Given two interval matchings µ and µ ′ , we can define the set of atmoless agents who prefer µ ′ to µ, as well as the set of atomless objects that are matched with higher ranked agents at µ ′ : 17
The following result generalizes the decomposition lemma of Knuth (1976) in standard two-sided matching problems. It says that at any two F-stable matchings µ 15 For simplicity, we abuse the notations slightly. Given
16 There could exist multiple interval matchings that induce one random allocation, but they are essentially equivalent: the differences are only due to different specifications of the partitions.
17 Since each set defined here is the union of uncountably many closed intervals, we take the closure to make sure that it is closed. and µ ′ , the atomless agents who prefer µ ′ are matched with those atomless objects assigned higher ranked agents at µ.
Lemma 2 Suppose that µ and µ ′ are F-stable. For any i ∈ N and
An immediate result from this decomposition lemma is that an agent's probability of being assigned some object, as well as an object's probability of being assigned to some agent, is constant across all the ex-ante fair random allocations. This generalizes the rural hospital theorem (Roth, 1986) .
We establish the lattice structure of E using Lemma 2. For any M and M ′ , denote
If these matrices are well-defined random allocations, then they are the least upper bound (the join) and the greatest lower bound (the meet) of {M, M ′ }, respectively, under the antisymmetric relation R sd N . Generally, ≽ sd A is not a partial order due to the possible ties in priorities. But as shown in Proposition 2, it is a partial order on E . So if some random allocationM satisfies
for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A, thenM is the least upper bound of {M,
for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A, then M is the greatest lower bound of {M,
A main result of this paper is that E is a lattice with respect to R sd N or ≽ sd A .
Proposition 2 For any
An immediate consequence from the lattice structure is that if objects have intrinsic preferences consistent with priority orderings, then agents and objects have conflicting interests regarding ex-ante fair allocations.
Corollary 2 For any
Different from the standard two-sided matching problem, E might be infinite. Given any subset S ⊆ E , define the matrices sup(S) and inf (S) as follows:
If sup(S) and inf (S) are well-defined random allocations, then they are the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of S under R sd N , respectively. The next result shows that the lattice (E , R sd N ) is complete, and distributive.
In light of Corollary 2, the lattice (E , ≽ sd A ) is also complete and distributive. Completeness implies that there exists a unique agent-optimal ex-ante fair random allocation, which first-order stochastically dominates all the ex-ante fair random allocations. The main results in this section (Proposition 1, Lemma 2, Corollary 1, Proposition 2, Corollary 2 and Proposition 3) generalize the corresponding results in the standard two-sided matching problem. None of these results holds for stable deterministic allocations under weak priorities.
Agent-optimal ex-ante fair mechanism
The structure of the set of ex-ante fair random allocations is established by exploring the connection with F-stable interval matchings. A stable deterministic matching in the continuum matching market induces an ex-ante fair random allocation for the original problem. We can apply deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) to the continuum matching market. This will lead to a generalized deferred acceptance procedure for the original problem, which selects the agent-optimal exante fair allocation. It is sufficient to study intervals of agents in the continuum problem, so in the generalized deferred acceptance procedure for the original problem, we will have fractions of agents applying to objects.
Given some fractions of agents {i 1 (
clearly an object a can choose the "best" fractions of agents such that the sum of the measures of these fractions is 1, according to the priority relation ≻ a([0,1]) defined in Section 2.1. Given e = (N, A, R, ≽), we now define the generalized deferred acceptance procedure as follows.
Step 1 The whole unit of each agent applies to her favorite object. Each object tentatively accepts the best fractions from the applicants, such that the sum of the measures of these fractions does not exceed one, and rejects all the other fractions of applicants.
Step k If a fraction F of an agent i is rejected by some object in step k − 1, then the fraction F of i applies to i's next best object. Each object chooses from the applying fractions as well as those tentatively accepted fractions , tentatively accepts the best fractions such that the sum does not exceed one, and rejects all the other fractions.
For each k, define the tentative assignment matrix M k (e) for the agents as follows. For any i and a, let M k ia (e) be the sum of the measures of fractions of i that are either tentatively accepted by a at step k − 1 (i.e., on the waiting list of a at step k − 1), or applying to a at step k. M k (e) is generally not a well-defined random allocation. For instance, M 1 ia (e) = 1 for any agent i whose favorite object is a.
The described deferred acceptance procedure will generally not terminate in a finite number of steps. For any i, a and
It can be easily seen that, due to the deferred acceptance procedure, both
and
are bounded decreasing sequences of real numbers. Hence
is convergent. Let lim k→∞ M k (e) denote the limit of this sequence of matrices, i.e., for any i and a, [lim 
Proposition 4 For any e, lim k→∞ M k (e) is a well-defined random allocation and it is agentoptimal ex-ante fair.
Let f GDA (e) = lim k→∞ M k (e). f GDA is generalized deferred acceptance mechanism (GDA). The simple and neat structure of the convergent sequence of tentative assignments
helps us easily establish the ex-ante fairness of f GDA (e). The agents become worse-off in each step:
(e) for all k and i. In the proof we show that the tentative assignment at each step first-order stochastically dominates every ex-ante fair allocation for all the agents. Hence, in the limit, f GDA (e) is agent-optimal ex-ante fair.
GDA closely resembles the fractional deferred acceptance algorithm (FDA) in Kesten and Ünver (2015) . In FDA, it is irrelevant that which fraction of an agent is applying, and an object tries to tentatively accept an equal fraction of each equally ranked applying agent. Instead of ex-ante fairness, they propose a notion of strong ex-ante stability which consists of ex-ante stability and no ex-ante discrimination. Then FDA selects the agent-optimal strongly ex-ante stable random allocation. 18 GDA generalizes the original deferred acceptance algorithm from Gale and Shapley (1962) . It also generalizes the probabilistic serial mechanism (PS) from Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) . Given a problem e = (N, A, R, ≽), where all the agents are ranked equally by each object, PS selects a random allocation as follows.
Let A 1 = A and r 1 (a) = 1 for each a ∈ A. Given i ∈ N and
Intuitively, all the agents are consuming, or "eating", their best available objects at the speed of one simultaneously. It can be easily seen that for this special priority structure, GDA is reduced to PS. Alternatively, this equivalence also follows from the fact that, in house allocation problems, ex-ante fairness is equivalent to the combination of ordinal fairness and non-wastefulness, and PS is characterized by these two axioms (Hashimoto et al., 2014) .
In spite of the interesting ex-ante properties, GDA is not strategy-proof, which follows from the non-strategy-proofness of PS. In fact, GDA is not even weakly strategy-proof, i.e., an agent could potentially manipulate her preferences to obtain a strictly better lottery. In contrast, DA with fixed tie-breaking, a common mechanism in school choice problems, is strategy-proof and ex-post stable. But such a mechanism is not ex-ante stable (Kesten and Ünver, 2015) , ordinally fair or sd-efficient for the two sides of the market (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) . Its outcome can even be dominated within the set of ex-post stable allocations (Erdil and Ergin, 2008) .
Allocation by division
The construction of ex-ante fair solutions is based on a new method of extending deterministic allocation mechanisms to random environment, which we call allocation by division. The general idea behind allocation by division is as follows. We first divide agents and objects into parts. Then we grant different priority rights to different parts of each agent and treat the parts of equally ranked agents symmetrically. Finally, applying a stable deterministic allocation mechanism to this divided problem will generate a fair random allocation for the original problem. To accommodate all the possible weak priority structures, in Section 3.1 we have to divide each agent or object into a continuum of parts. 19 A stable deterministic allocation in the continuum problem gives an ex-ante fair random allocation for the original problem. In Section 4, we see that applying the deferred acceptance algorithm to the continuum problem leads to GDA. However, when the priority structure is relatively simple, it is sufficient to divide agents and objects into a finite number of parts.
For simplicity, in the rest of this section assume |N| = |A| in any problem e = (N, A, R, ≽) . Given e, we define the corresponding C-divided problem e C = (N C , A C , R C , ≽ C ), where C is a positive integer. All the agents and objects are divided into C parts: N C = {i k } k∈{1,...,C},i∈N and A C = {a k } k∈{1,...,C},a∈A . For any
give a random allocation M for e: for any i ∈ N and a ∈ A,
We show that the previous generalizations of PS can be obtained by finitely dividing those allocation problems and applying corresponding deterministic allocation mechanisms. First, Katta and Sethuraman (2006) propose an extended PS solution to house allocation problems with weak preferences. The extended PS is a correspondence, but it is essentially single-valued since each agent is indifferent between any two allocations selected by this correspondence. Let E H A denote the class of house allocation problems with weak preferences. Given any e = (N, A, R, ≽) ∈ E H A , the extended PS is defined as follows. 20
. Then the objects in B N k (A k−1 ) are allocated to N k at step k: each i ∈ N k is assigned the objects in B i (A k−1 ) with a probability of
Denote the resulting set of allocations as f EPS (e).
In the extended PS, the agents are still consuming the objects at the unit rate, but to guarantee sd-efficiency, the "bottleneck sets" (N k ) have to be identified. A class of deterministic solutions to E H A , serial dictatorships, are given by Svensson (1994) . Given e ∈ E H A and an ordering σ of agents, where σ : {1, 2, ..., |N|} → N, σ is a bijection, define the following sequence of choice sets:
Then the serial dictatorship with respect to σ selects the set of deterministic allocations {M : ∀i ∈ N, M ia = 1 for some a ∈ B i (A i )}. Obviously a serial dictatorship is an essentially single-valued correspondence. A deterministic allocation is efficient if and only if it is selected by some serial dictatorship. Given e ∈ E H A , serial dictatorships can be applied to e C . To respect the priorities in e C , we restrict attention to the set of orderings σ(e C ), where for each σ ∈ σ(e C ), k 1 < k 2 implies σ(i k 1 ) < σ(j k 2 ) for all i, j ∈ N. Then let f SD (C, e) denote the set of random allocations that are generated from applying the serial dictatorships with respect to each σ ∈ σ(e C ) to the divided problem e C .
Proposition 5
For any e = (N, A, R, ≽) ∈ E H A , there exists C such that f SD (C, e) and f EPS (e) are essentially equivalent: for any M ∈ f SD (C, e) and M ′ ∈ f EPS (e), MR sd N M ′ and M ′ R sd N M. In particular, f SD ((|N|!) |A| , e) and f EPS (e) are essentially equivalent.
Next, we consider allocation problems with initial property rights, or house allocation with existing tenants (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1999) . 21 Initial property rights can be modeled as a special type of priority structures: the owner of an object is ranked strictly higher than all the other agents. Then the requirement of individual rationality, i.e., an agent's random allocation must first-order stochastically dominate the degenerate lottery of receiving her endowment, is captured by ex-ante stability. Formally, let E HET denote the set of allocation problems with initial property rights.
For each e = (N, A, R, ≽) ∈ E HET , there exist non-empty N(e) ⊆ N and a one-toone function h e : N(e) → A such that (1) for each a ∈ h e (N(e)), h −1 e (a) ≻ a i ∼ a j for all i, j ∈ N \ h −1 e (a) , and (2) for each a / ∈ h e (N(e)), i ∼ a j for all i, j ∈ N. 22 For i ∈ N ′ ⊆ N(e), denote U i = {a ∈ A : aR i h e (i)} and U N ′ = ∪ i∈N ′ U i . Yılmaz (2010) defines individually rational PS. 23 Under this mechanism, agents are still consuming their best available objects at the unit rate, but to satisfy the individual rationality constraints, for any N ′ ⊆ N(e), the objects U N ′ have to be entitled to N ′ . Specifically, suppose that some i / ∈ N ′ is also consuming some object in U N ′ . If at some point, continuing to consume this object implies that some agent in N ′ has to consume an object worse than her endowment later, then i is asked to stop consuming anything in U N ′ . Denote the individually rational PS as f IRPS . Its formal definition is given in Appendix E.
Given e ∈ E HET , the set of efficient and individually rational deterministic allocations is characterized by individually rational serial dictatorships, which are constructed similarly to the serial dictatorships of Svensson (1994) . Given an ordering σ, consider the following choice sets:
Then the individually rational serial dictatorship selects the deterministic allocation M with M iB i (A i ) = 1 for all i ∈ N. Given the corresponding divided problem e C , let f IRSD (C, e) denote the set of random allocations for e which are generated from 22 Assume that preferences are strict. Yılmaz (2009) generalizes PS to the allocation problems with initial property rights and weak preferences, which incorporates the techniques from Katta and Sethuraman (2006) and Yılmaz (2010). Our results can be easily extended to this case, but we consider weak preferences and initial property rights separately to better understand the ideas behind each case.
23 Individually rational PS is sd-efficient and satisfies an envy-free condition, but it is not ordinally fair. GDA can be applied to E HET , but it is not sd-efficient. Generally (sd-) efficiency and (ex-ante) stability are not compatible, but for special priority structures efficient and stable solutions do exist.
applying the individually rational serial dictatorships with respect to each σ ∈ σ(e C ) to the divided problem e C .
Proposition 6
For any e = (N, A, R, ≽) ∈ E HET , there exists C such that f IRSD (C, e) is single-valued and f IRSD (C, e) = f IRPS (e). In particular, f IRSD ((|N|!) |A| 2 , e) = f IRPS (e).
Both the extended PS and the individually rational PS are defined based on the "eating process" in the original PS. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) transform the problem into a network flow problem and use the max-flow min-cut theorem to show that the extended PS is well-defined. On the other hand, Yılmaz (2010) uses the supplydemand theorem (Gale, 1957) to show that the individually rational PS is well-defined. f SD and f IRSD are always well-defined. In establishing their equivalence to the extended PS and the individually rational PS respectively, we simply invoke Hall's theorem. This is not surprising, since logically Hall's theorem is based on both the max-flow min-cut theorem and the supply-demand theorem. 24 There are several other generalizations of PS in previous studies. We can establish similar results as Proposition 5 and 6. The techniques are largely the same, so we omit the formal treatment of these cases. First, in house allocation problems with multi-unit demands, there are two forms of serial dictatorships. An agent with a demand of q can pick the best q objects available when it is her turn to pick. 25 Applying this mechanism to some divided problem can generate the PS generalized (and characterized) by Heo (2014) , in which an agent with a demand of q has an eating speed of q. In the second form of serial dictatorships, each agent picks only one object when it is her turn and there are multiple rounds of sequential allocations until everyone's demand is satisfied. 26 Applying this mechanism to some divided problem will generate the PS generalized by Kojima (2009) , in which an agent with a demand of q is still eating at unit rate, but she can eat from t = 0 to t = q. Finally, Budish et al. (2013) generalizes PS to accommodate various constraint structures in practical allocation problems, such as controlled choice requirements 24 Specifically, Hall's theorem can be proved from the max-flow min-cut theorem, and it is a special (and discrete) case of the supply-demand theorem.
25 For studies on this mechanism, see Pápai (2000 Pápai ( , 2001 , Klaus and Miyagawa (2001) , Ehlers and Klaus (2003) , Bogolmonaia et al. (2014) .
26 See Bogolmonaia et al. (2014) for a discussion on this mechanism. While the first type of serial dictatorships is generally strategy-proof, the second type is not. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) show that RSD is equivalent to the mechanism that selects the core from random endowments. Using the second type of serial dictatorships, Bogolmonaia et al. (2014) generalize this result to the case of multi-unit demands.
in school choice. Agents are still eating the best available objects at the unit rate, but the availability of objects depends on the constraint structure. This version of PS can also be obtained by applying a constrained sequential allocation procedure to finitely divided problems.
The PS solutions, as well as our ex-ante fair solutions, are broadly interpreted as random allocation mechanisms generated from deterministic allocation mechanisms using the allocation by division method. Compared to randomizing over deterministic allocation mechanisms, this class of mechanisms generally has superior efficiency and fairness properties from the ex-ante perspective, but cannot preserve strategy-proofness. This is mainly due to the fact that generally the ex-ante properties are not compatible with strategy-proofness, as suggested in previous impossibility results (Zhou, 1990 , Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 , Katta and Sethuraman, 2006 , Kojima, 2009 , Heo, 2014 , Kesten and Ünver, 2015 , Han, 2016 . Both methods are commonly observed in practice. For instance, when allocating one single object between two agents, we could either flip a coin and let one agent have this object (randomization), or let each agent have this object for half of the time (allocation by division). To apply the allocation by division method, we need to divide the agents and objects into some "correct" number of parts: allocating three time slots between two agents cannot be fair. When allocating one object among some set of agents N, to accommodate all the possible cases the object and the agents can be divided in to |N|! parts. Proposition 5 shows that, to allocation more than one object, we can simply raise |N|! to the power of the number of objects. Dividing the objects and agents into (|N|!) |A| parts and applying sequential allocation mechanisms can lead to the unique ordinally fair random allocation. 27
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we propose a new fair solution to the allocation problems with weak priority structures, which encompasses important results from both the two-sided matching and the one-sided matching literature. Such a unification sheds some new lights on several interesting open questions in the matching literature, including the 27 Although the number is generally very large, it is a finite number and works for all the possible preference profiles. In Proposition 6, the number is enlarged to (|N|!) |A| 2 . This is because that there are more steps when allocating the objects in the presence of the individual rationality constraints.
robustness of the properties of stable matchings to weak orderings, and the connection between PS and deterministic allocation mechanisms.
Throughout the paper we have restricted attention to the one-to-one matching context, but the results can be easily extended to allow multiple copies of each object, as in school choice. In this case, to establish the lattice structure and related results, we only need to modify the construction of the continuum matching market by mapping all the atomless objects of each type to a larger interval, according to the quota of each object. Similarly, in defining GDA, an object can tentatively accept fractions of agents up to its quota in each step.
Although weak priorities are allowed in the model, our main results cannot be generalized to the case of weak orderings on both sides of the market. When preferences are weak, the connection between stable deterministic allocations in the continuum problem and ex-ante fair random allocations in the original problem disappears, and the set of ex-ante fair random allocations is no longer a lattice. This is not surprising, since allocation by division is mainly a method to deal with equal priority rights.
For future research, there could be more interesting results in two-sided matching theory that can be generalized into our framework. The allocation by division method can potentially be applied to other classes of allocation or matching problems to generate fair random allocations. It is also interesting to explore the performance of this method, as well as its connection with the randomization method, in large markets.
Appendix A: Proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose some M is ex-ante fair, but there exists
, and (ii) there exists some b ∈ A ∪ {i * } with a * P i * b and M i * b > 0. By (ii) and the ex-ante stability of M, we have M a * a * = 0 and j ≽ a * i * for all j with M ja * > 0. Then consider a * . M ′ a * ≽ sd a * M a * and M ′ i * a * > M i * a * imply that we cannot have j ≻ a * i * for all j with M ja * > 0. Therefore, there exists some j such that j ∼ a * i * , M ja * > 0 and k ≽ a * j for all k with M ka
with respect to R i * * . Continue in this fashion, since N is finite, there exist a list of distinct agents (i 1 , i 2 , ..., i k ) and a list of (possibly non-distinct) objects (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a k ) such that for each l ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, we have
, and i l−1 ∼ a l−1 i l , where a 0 = a k , i 0 = i k . Then for each l, since M i l a l−1 > 0, and M is ordinally fair, we have the following inequalities:
This implies that
Clearly a contradiction is reached.
Proof of Lemma 1. "if" part. Suppose µ is F-stable. Assume M is not ex-ante stable, then there exist i ∈ N and a ∈ A such that M ib > 0 for some b ∈ A ∪ {i} with aP i b, and M ja > 0 for some j ∈ N ∪ {a} with i ≻ a j. By A.1 there exist F, G such that
. This contradicts to the F-stability of µ. Now suppose M is not ordinally fair. There exist i, j ∈ N, a ∈ A with i ∼ a j, M ia > 0, and ∑ bR j a M jb < ∑ bR i a M ib . By A.1 and A.6, there exist 1 , 2 such that
Then by A.4 and A.6 there exist F a and λ such that µ(i( (F a ) ), i ∼ a j and F j < F i . Finally by A.6 and the construction of F j , a(F a )P j(F j ) µ(j(F j )). This contradicts to the F-stability of µ.
with aP i b. Similarly, by A.6, there does not exist any F such that i(F) ∈ µ(a(F a )). Then there are two cases to consider. Case 1. There exist some F and j with i ≻ a j such that j(
Case 2. There exist some j and 
Appendix B: Any random allocation is induced by some interval matching
Given a random allocation M, we construct an interval matching µ that induces M.
The following iterative procedure specifies how the objects in a( [x, y] ) are matched with the agents in D m by µ.
This process terminates when for some l ′ , x l ′ = y. Repeat this process for each m ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} and each a ∈ A. Then by this construction, µ satisfies A.1, A.2 and A.3. We can impose A.4 and A.5 on µ, then A.6 is also satisfied.
Appendix C: Proofs for Section 3.2
To facilitate the proofs in this section, we first explicitly construct the sets B o (µ),
Consider any two interval matchings µ and µ ′ , with partitions {Q o } o∈N∪A and
Similarly, for each a ∈ A, construct I a (µ ′ ) as follows:
Proof of Lemma 2. We first show the following two claims.
Proof of Claim 1. Assume to the contrary, it is not true that
Claim 2. For any a ∈ A and F a with F a ⊆ F for some
Proof of Claim 2. Assume to the contrary, for some i( (F a ) ), contradicting to the F-stability of µ ′ . If b = a, then it must be the case that (F a ) ). Hence F b > F a , and we do not have
To show the decomposition lemma, it is sufficient to show that for any i and
µ)}, and for any a and
Consider any i and
Then by the linearity of f and f ′ , for any > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for all
is closed. This shows that for any i and
By a similar argument, it can be shown that for any a and
|F|. It follows that for any i and
Proof of Proposition 2 Let M, M ′ ∈ E . Suppose µ induces M and µ ′ induces M ′ . By Lemma 1 both µ and µ ′ are F-stable. We construct another interval matching in the following recursive way. For any i ∈ N and a ∈ A, let F 0 a = F 0 i = φ, and
.., |N|}, σ is a bijection. In general, at the k th step, k ≥ 1,
• For all the other i and a, let
Let n be the smallest integer such that I n i = φ for all i ∈ N, then the process terminates at step n. To see that this process of sequential allocation is well-defined, we invoke the decomposition lemma to show that each interval of agents or objects is assigned at most once. First, at any step
. Suppose this is not true. Without loss of generality assume
contradicting to the statement shown in the last paragraph.
Given that each µ k is well-defined, for any o ∈ N ∪ A and
. For each i ∈ N, let Q i be the partition such that F (Q i ) = F n i . For each a ∈ A, let Q a be the minimal partition such that F n a ⊆ F (Q a ). For any a and F ∈ F (Q a ) \ F n a , let µ * (a(F)) = {a(F)}. Then µ * , with respect to {Q a } a∈N∪A , satisfies A.1, A.2 and A.3. We can impose A.4 and A.5 on µ * . Thus it remains to show that A.6 (monotonicity) is satisfied. Consider any i ∈ N, F, G ∈ F (Q i ) and
. By a similar argument, it can be shown that for any a ∈ A, F, G ∈ F (Q a ) and F < G, µ * (a(F)) ≻ a(F) µ * (a(G)).
So far it has been shown that µ * is a well-defined interval matching, now we show that µ * is F-stable. Suppose that this is not the case. Then there exist i ∈ N, a ∈ A and
It can be easily seen that 
Hence M k is not sd-efficient for the two sides of the market, contradicting to Proposition 1. Finally, M^N M ′ ∈ E and M _ A M ′ = M^N M ′ can be shown by a set of symmetric arguments.
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider any S ⊆ E and sup(S). Clearly
Given any i and a, since
To show that sup(S) is a well-defined random allocation, it only remains to show that ∑ i∈N [sup(S)] ia ≤ 1 for all a ∈ A. Suppose this is not true for some a ∈ A. Then for each i ∈ N, there exists M i ∈ S such that
Summing over N, we have
which contradicts to Proposition 3, since S ′ is finite. Now we show that sup(S) ∈ E . Suppose that sup(S) is not ordinally fair. Then
Now suppose that sup(S) is not ex-ante stable, then there exist i ∈ N, a ∈ A such that [sup(S)] ib > 0 for some b ∈ A ∪ {i} with aP i b, and [sup(S)] ja > 0 for some j ∈ N ∪ {a} with i ≻ a j. Clearly we have M ic > 0 for some c ∈ A ∪ {i} with aP i c for all M ∈ S. If j ∈ N, then there exists M ∈ S with M ja > 0, contradicting to the ex-ante stability of M. If j = a, then for each k ∈ N, there exists
ib is a decreasing sequence for each i, there exists K such that for
of agent i is either applying to a at step k or is tentatively accepted by a at a step before k. However,
A contradiction is reached since a will reject some fraction in [∑ bP i a M * ib + , ∑ bR i a M * ib ] of some agent i ∈ N ′ at step K. Hence M * is a well-defined random allocation. Now we show M * is ex-ante fair. Suppose M * is not ex-ante stable, then there exist i ∈ N, a ∈ A such that M * ib > 0 for some b ∈ A ∪ {i} with aP i b and M * ja > 0 for some j ∈ N ∪ {a} with i ≻ a j. Obviously, there is a fraction of i that is rejected by a at some step K. Then for all k > K, ∑ l∈N M k la ≥ 1, thus ∑ l∈N M * la = 1. This implies that we cannot have j = a. If j ∈ N, since M * ja > 0, pick some such that 0 < < M * ja . Then there exists
of j are either applying to a or tentatively accepted by a before step k, which is impossible since i ≻ a j and i has a fraction rejected by a at step K.
Suppose M * is not ordinally fair, then there exist i, j ∈ N, a ∈ A with i ∼ a j, M * ia > 0 and ∑ bR i a M * jb < ∑ bR i a M * ib . Similar to the previous arguments, we can find some x, y and K such that 
Then we show the following claim.
Claim 3. If some fraction F of i is rejected by a at some step, then for any G ⊆ F and ex-ante
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose Claim 3 is not true and let K be the first step that it is not true. Then some fraction F of i is rejected by a at step K, and for some G ⊆ F and exante fair allocation M, µ M (i(G)) = a. If a fraction F ′ of i is tentatively accepted by a at step K, then µ M (i(F ′ )) = a, since K is the first step that Claim 3 is not true and µ M satisfies A.6 (monotonicity). This implies that there exists some fraction F ′′ of some agent j ∕ = i that is tentatively accepted by a at step K and µ M (j(F ′′ )) = b ∕ = a. Again, by the fact that K is the first step that Claim 3 is not true, we have aP j b. Since F ′′ of j is tentatively accepted by a and G of i is rejected at the same step, j(F ′′ ) ≻ a([0,1]) i(G), contradicting to the F-stability of µ M .
It can be easily seen that Claim 3 further implies that if some fraction F of i is rejected by a at some step, then for any G ⊆ F and ex-ante fair allocation M, µ M (i(G)) = b implies aP i b. Consider any M k and ex-ante fair allocation M, suppose for some i ∈ N and a ∈ A,
is rejected by a at some step and µ M (i(F)) = b for some bR i a, contradiction. Hence for any M k and ex-ante fair allocation M, M k i R sd i M i for all i ∈ N. It follows that M * R sd N M, so M * is agent-optimal ex-ante fair.
Proof of Proposition 5
Given e = (N, A, R, ≽) ∈ E H A , we show that f SD (|N!| |A| , e) and f EPS (e) are essentially equivalent. Let C = |N!| |A| . Suppose the extended PS algorithm terminates at stepk. Let {λ k }¯k k=1 , {N k }¯k k=1 and {A k }¯k k=1 be the sequences defined in the extended PS. Then ∑¯k k=1 λ k = 1 and by the construction it can be easily seen that λ k C is a natural number for each k ∈ 1, 2, ...,k . Given k ∈ 1, 2, ...,k , define
for each l ∈ {0, 1, ..., k}, with N 0 = N. Then we have for each k ≥ 2,
Consider any σ ∈ σ(e C ) and any deterministic allocation M C selected by the serial dictatorship. Let M be the random allocation for e that is generated by M C . For simplicity, we denote
The following statement is the key to the proof.
Claim 4. For any k ∈ 1, 2, ...,k and l ∈ {0, 1, .
Before proving Claim 4, we first show that it implies that f SD (|N!| |A| , e) and f EPS (e) are essentially equivalent. For any k, if i ∈ N k ∩ I l (k − 1), then in the random allocation M we have
. By the construction of λ k , it must be the case that ∑ a∈B i (A k−1 ) M ia = λ k + s k−1 (i).
To show Claim 4, first consider k = 1. By the construction of serial dictatorships, it is sufficient show that there exists some allocation in which each i t , i ∈ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ λ 1 C, is assigned some a t with a ∈ B i (A). If there does not exist such an allocation, then by Hall's theorem, there exists some N ′ ∈ N, T i ∈ {1, 2, ..., λ 1 C} for each i ∈ N ′ such that | ∑ i∈N ′ T i | > C|B N ′ (A)|. 
, is assigned some a t with a ∈ B i (A k−1 ) and t ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}. Suppose that there does not exist such an allocation. Then by Hall's theorem there exists some
contradicting to the definition of λ k .
Appendix E: Individually rational PS and proof of Proposition 6
Given e ∈ E HET , the individually rational PS is defined as follows.
Let λ 0 = 0, r 1 (a) = 1 for each a ∈ A, and v 1 (i) = B i (A) for each i ∈ N. At step k, k ≥ 1, for each a ∈ A with r k (a) > 0, define The process terminates at some step k ′ if r k ′ +1 (a) = 0 for all a ∈ A.
Proof of Proposition 6
Given e = (N, A, R, ≽) ∈ E HET , we show that f IRSD ((|N|!) |A| 2 , e) is single-valued and f IRSD ((|N|!) |A| 2 , e) = f IRPS (e). Let C = (|N|!) |A| 2 . Suppose the individually rational PS algorithm terminates at stepk. Let {λ k }¯k k=0 , {r k (a)}¯k k=1 , a ∈ A, and {v k (i)}¯k k=1 , i ∈ N be the sequences defined in the individually rational PS. Then ∑¯k k=1 λ k = 1 and by the construction it can be easily seen that λ k C is a natural number for each k ∈ 1, 2, ...,k . Consider any σ ∈ σ(e C ) and the deterministic allocation M C selected by the individually rational serial dictatorship. Let M be the random allocation for e that is generated by M C . For simplicity, we denote γ(i t ) = a if M C i t a t ′ = 1 for some t ′ . Then it is sufficient to show the following claim.
Claim 5. For any k ∈ 1, 2, ...,k and i ∈ N, γ(i t ) = v k (i) for all t with ∑ k−1
We first show that Claim 5 holds for k = 1. By the construction of the individually rational serial dictatorship, it is sufficient to show that there exists an allocation in which i t is assigned some part of v 1 (i) for all i and t with 1 ≤ t ≤ λ 1 C, and for all i ∈ N(e), t > λ 1 C, each i t is assigned some part of an object in U i . Suppose there does not exist such an allocation. Then by Hall's theorem, there exist some N 1 ⊆ N, (T 1 i ) i∈N 1 , T 1 i ∈ {1, ..., λ 1 C} for each i ∈ N 1 , and N 2 ⊆ N(e), (T 2 i ) i∈N 2 , T 2 i ∈ 1, ..., ∑¯k m=2 λ m C for each i ∈ N 2 , such that contradiction. Suppose Claim 5 holds for some k ≥ 1. Establishing Claim 5 for k + 1 completes the proof. By the construction of the individually rational serial dictatorship, it is sufficient to show that there exists some allocation in which i t is assigned some part of v k+1 (i) for all i and t with ∑ ∑ a∈∪ i∈N 1 {v k+1 (i)} r k+1 (a)
contradicting to the definition of λ k+1 . Suppose N 2 ∕ = φ. Let N 3 = i ∈ N 1 : r k+1 (i) ∈ U N 2 and N 4 = N 1 \ N 3 . Then This implies N 3 ∕ = φ and
contradiction.
